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Abstract
When social benets cannot be measured, an organization that selects managers based on
pro-social motivation can be used to balance prots with a social purpose. This paper develops
a model of social enterprise based on selection of citizen-managers to run rms with exible
missions. We analyze organizational choice between social enterprise, for-prots, and non-
prots. The paper also develops the implications of matching between founders and managers
based on their preferences for the mission.
1 Introduction
Two kinds of private organizations dominate the market place: for-prots and non-prots. Non-prot
organizations are rigid due to the non-distribution constraint. However, this helps to secure social
benets as it reduces managerial rent-seeking (see Hansmann (1980) and Glaeser and Shleifer (2001)
among others). Their operation can be further enhanced by selecting employees who are committed
to the cause as observed, for example, by Weisbrod (1988) and Besley and Ghatak (2005).
Standard for-prot rms also have a rigid mission, to maximize the prot of their owners. This
may be reinforced by selecting managers who care solely about money the usual homo economicus
assumption. These managers are rewarded with bonuses based on protability to encourage e¤ort.
The focus on prot can, however, lead to a social cost when protable actions do not reect social
values. Everything from environmental pollution to poor treatment of workers is blamed on placing
the pursuit of prot above all else.
Recognizing these issues, there is much recent interest in more exible organizational forms which
combine prot with purpose, securing the right trade-o¤between pro-social behavior and e¢ ciency.
These hybrid forms of organization, are often referred to as social enterprises. Even though, as
Email address: t.besley@lse.ac.uk and m.ghatak@lse.ac.uk. We thank Tore Ellingsen, Claudio Schilter, Roberto
Sormani, Munir Squires, Lars Stole, Eddy H.F. Tam, and many seminar audiences for helpful feedback. We also thank
two anonymous referees, and the editor, Dan Silverman, for helpful comments.
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Martin and Osberg (2007) acknowledge, there are many di¤erent types of rms which travel under
this banner, the mantra of social enterprise is to balance making prots with a social mission (Katz
and Page, 2010).1 This eschews the rigidity of either non-prot or for-prot enterprise.
To be e¤ective, social enterprises have to solve the problem of achieving the right trade-o¤between
the dual objectives of prot and purpose. We call this the mission integrity problem. In the absence
of contractual solutions, this creates a role for what Katz and Page (2010) call mission-sympathetic
partieswho are appointed to achieve an optimal trade-o¤ between mission and prot. Selection on
motivation can then be used to achieve mission integrity.
This paper explores the ideas by developing a model of social enterprise where rms are run by
mission sympathetic managers -we call them citizen-managers - who balance prot with purpose.
The model has four key features. First, protability and social payo¤s sometimes diverge; however,
only prot can be measured or contracted upon. Second, the enterprise requires a manager to put
in e¤ort to improve overall e¢ ciency, as well as to decide whether to pursue prot or social purpose
in its key decisions depending on the situation (the mission integrity problem). Third, organization
design determines whether there is a rigid mission or the trade-o¤ between prot and mission is left
to the discretion of the manager, and the allocation of any residual cash ow. Fourth, rms or
foundersemploy managers who care about the mission and who are hired in a competitive labor
market.
We focus on three organizational forms: for-prots, non-prots, and social enterprises. With
a for-prot or social enterprise, the manager is a full residual claimant on prots, whereas with a
non-prot the managers wage is at. For-prots and non-prots curb the autonomy of managers
by stipulating a rigid mission. In a social enterprise, the manager has discretion over the balance
of prots and purpose. We allow founders and managers to di¤er in terms of their motivation, and
derive conditions under which an organizational form is optimal.
If managers are su¢ ciently motivated, non-prots and social enterprise are equivalent, as man-
agers always put more weight on mission than on prots. However, for moderately motivated man-
agers, the exibility of social enterprises mitigates the mission-prot trade-o¤, and we nd that giving
them discretion over action choice can be benecial from the point of view of e¤ort incentives. For
these managers, the total expected return from e¤ort (pecuniary plus mission-related) is higher than
in non-prots or for-prots. However, this e¤ect has to be balanced against fact that if the social
payo¤ is very valuable to the founder, then non-prots should be chosen over for-prots as well as
social enterprises. The trade-o¤ between greater incentives that come from managerial autonomy,
and the founders valuation of the social payo¤given the non-rival nature of the social payo¤between
1Terms like public benet corporations(Shiller, 2012), social enterprise(Dees, 1998, Bornstein, 2004) or social
business(Yunus, 2007) are part of the lexicon but all stand for somewhat di¤erent organizational forms.
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the manager and the founder drives organizational form in our model. This allows us to break out
of the for-prot vs. non-prot trade-o¤, which the existing literature has mostly focused on. Our
approach also gives a range of empirical predictions about where in the economy we would expect
social enterprises to emerge in terms of features of the technology.
We nd that a more motivated manager puts in greater e¤ort which lessens the e¢ ciency loss in
a non-prot, which a motivated founder tends to favour. We characterize conditions under which
this complementarity between founder and manager motivation leads to stable assortative matching
where selsh managers and founders match together in for-prot rms, highly motivated founders and
managers set up non-prot rms, and those with middle levels of motivation set up social enterprises.
This result shows that social enterprises can exist even when one allows for market competition for
managers from other forms of enterprise. It also is practically relevant in the context of the debate
about what it makes to have social enterprises making a di¤erence beyond what can be achieved by
a either a non-prot or a for-prot.
Another interesting implication of our framework is that when the founder does not like the social
payo¤ (puts a negative weight on it) then our model corresponds to a standard agency problem where
the social payo¤ is like a private benet to the manager. We show for-prots that prohibit taking
the pro-social action will be the preferred organizational form if the founder dislikes the social payo¤
enough. This is an interesting result given the well-known claim by Friedman (1970) that the only
social responsibility of business is to make prots.
The approach that we take challenges a central tenet of standard economic design where the
assumption of homo economicus restricts attention to agents with narrowly self-interested goals.
Here, we show that the sustainability of social enterprise can rest on the selection of agents with
appropriate motivations to achieve a trade-o¤ between prot and wider social goals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses some related
literature. Section three lays out the theoretical framework where rms employ motivated managers
to make decisions which a¤ect prots and some social objective. In section four, we use the model
to compare three organizational forms: for-prots, non-prots, and social enterprises. Section four
develops the model to allow motivated managers and rm founders to match. Section ve discusses
some empirical implications and concluding comments are in section six.
2 Related Literature
There is signicant popular discussion of the role of social enterprise in the economy, given that there
are many real-world examples of social enterprises in both the developed and developing worlds (see
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Porter and Kramer, 2011). The management literature presents many interesting case studies. For
example, Lendstreet Financial pursues the social mission of helping indebted people reduce their debts
by delivering nancial literacy programmes and incentives that encourage responsible repayment.
Yet prior to delivering these services to a new client, Lendstreet purchases the clients debt from
institutional investors. When the client increases their repayment, Lendstreet earns revenue which
enables it to sustain its operations.2 The commercial micronance sector is another good example
where the social mission of relaxing borrowing constraints of the poor has come head to head with
proting at the expense of the poor, raising the spectre of "mission drift" (see Yunus, 2011). Ben and
Jerrys, is an ice-cream brand which was established to pursue strong ethical norms alongside more
commercial ends. For example, the ice-cream is manufactured in Vermont using hormone-free milk
sourced from local farms. However, it was eventually sold to Unilever at the behest of shareholders,
raising questions about how far it would continue to be run as a social enterprise.3 In this case,
the citizen-manager is the Unilever-appointed CEO, Justin Solheim, who promised when he was
appointed to uphold the history and the authenticity of the culture and valuesof the rm.
The failure of prot maximization to align with the public interest is a classic problem of mispricing
of inputs or outputs. We view social enterprises as trying to lean against this by employing decision
makers who sometimes consciously ignore price signals. This ties the paper to the growing literature
on motivation and incentives (see, for example, Ashraf et al, 2014a,b, Akerlof and Kranton, 2005,
Benabou and Tirole, 2006, 2010 Besley and Ghatak, 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur, 2010, Francois, 2000,
and Kosfeld and von Siemens, 2011). The general thrust of the literature is that intrinsic motivation
reduces the need to use explicit incentives (e.g., Besley and Ghatak, 2005). However, in the current
paper, greater manager motivation mitigates the mission integrity problem and this allows using
higher powered nancial incentives to stimulate e¤ort.4 A key issue which emerges in our study of
matching is how endogenously founder and manager motivation are similar so social enterprises tend
to have a shared vision throughout the rm. This links the paper to the literature on corporate
culture such as Van den Steen (2010a,b).
The extensive literature on non-prots (Hansmann, 1980, Weisbrod, 1988, and Glaeser and
Shleifer, 2001) is also relevant. A key theme of this literature is that the non-distribution con-
straintused by non-prots may be a constrained optimal choice in the presence of agency problems
which are often in the nature of multi-tasking problems (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) where
high powered incentives can distort allocation of e¤ort away from tasks whose outputs are hard to
measure. This leads to a cost-quality trade-o¤; for-prots lowers costs at the expenses of low unver-
2See Lee and Battilana (2013).
3See the discussion in Page and Katz (2012).
4 For experimental evidence, see Besley, Ghatak and Marden (2014), Fehrler and Kosfeld, (2012) and Tonin and
Vlassopoulos [2010].
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iable quality whereas non-prots reduce the incentive to shade quality in order to cut costs. The
choice of organizational forms depends upon how much the principal values quality (or any other
non-pecuniary aspects of production) as opposed to prots.
Even though, as we noted above, the potential role of non-prots to attract motivated managers
is recognized (see, for example, Weisbrod, 1988) the formal literature has not explicitly considered
the role of intrinsically motivated managers, and how their presence and selection interacts with the
underlying agency problems. Our key contribution is to show that once heterogeneity of manager
motivation and self-selection is taken into account, social enterprises emerge as a natural alternative
that allows us to go beyond the standard for-prot vs. non-prot trade-o¤. Another point of
departure is we have a transferable utility set up, and so it is possible to sell the project to the
manager (whether through sales, rental or franchising) that would overcome the agency problem by
making him the full residual claimant. In our set-up, the social payo¤ is non-rivalrous between the
founder and the manager and that is how the founders motivation matters for organizational choice.
If the founder did not care about the social payo¤, then organizational choice would reect the e¤ort
ranking of managers, which in turn would reect the motivation of the manager. On the other hand,
for any given level of manager motivation, the greater is the founders motivation, the more likely a
non-prot will be chosen over a social enterprise (or for-prot) despite the advantage of the social
enterprise in terms of managerial incentives.
Following Andreoni (1990), the literature on charitable giving has focused on the importance of
a warm glow motive in giving to charity. Our model of motivated managers and founders can be
interpreted as a form of warm glow in the sense identied there. The importance of such motives
in organization design is less appreciated than in charitable giving. As emphasized in Andreoni and
Payne (2013), there is signicant heterogeneity in preferences which is consistent with the idea that
there is potential for selection to be important.
The paper is also related to the emerging literature among economists on Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility (CSR). Here, we will have a trade-o¤ between mission and prots. In contrast, that
literature is largely interested in the possibility that the pursuit of pro-social ends could enhance
protability. For example, in Baron (2001), Bagnoli and Watts (2003), Besley and Ghatak (2007),
and Kotchen (2006), the presence of socially responsible consumers drive this possibility.
There is also a link to the literature on delegation and incentives (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997),
where giving greater discretion or authority to managers over project choice can improve e¤ort
incentives, as it is the case with managers in social enterprises. In our model of social enterprise, the
manager has the authority to control the mission whereas in a for-prot or a non-prot the mission
is not under the managers control - in the former case, it is to always maximize nancial returns
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and in the latter case, it is to prioritize the social mission over any nancial considerations.
Finally, the part of our model that relates to the composition of the pie in terms of social and
private payo¤ is related to the political agency literature that deals with issue of the decision-making
politician taking the rightaction in a given state of the world that is unobservable to the voter,
which is similar in spirit to our state-contingent action choice problem that we study here (see, for
example, Besley, 2004, Maskin and Tirole, 2004, and Smart and Sturm, 2013).
3 Theoretical Framework
The Firm Consider a rm which produces a discrete good or service which it sells to its customers.
The nancial prot to the rm (^), takes two values,  > 0 and 0:
The good may also generate a non-pecuniary benet relating to a social objective. This will
(stochastically) depend on the rms actions as well as exogenous factors. This benet is like a
standard externality, excluding consumer surplus and the nancial prot of the rm. However, the
benet need not be completely external to the rm; it may also be valued by those who are associated
with the rm. We will be more explicit in formulating the payo¤s below. Let  denote the total
social payo¤ (in units of money) among all stakeholders, i.e. those who work in the rm and/or have
an interest in the decision that it makes.
The rm consists of a founder (or an owner) and a manager. Firms are established by founders
who are motivated by a combination of prots and social payo¤s. To be specic, let us suppose the
rm charges a price p and the consumer receives a utility of v; it costs  to produce a unit of the
good. The net surplus to the consumer from consuming the good is v   p, i.e. consumer surplus.
The rms nancial prot is ^ = p   : We normalize the reservation payo¤ of the consumer if she
does not consume the good to zero and so the rm can charge up to p = v: The rm can choose how
to price the good, who to allocate it to, and/or the choice of technology which a¤ects the production
cost, .
We have two broad types of social objective in mind.5
The rst is a redistributive motive. There are some goods where the goal is to widen access;
education, health care and legal services are important examples. Tobin (1970) referred to this as
specic egalitarianism. Firms must decide whether it should value access to certain goods in its
pricing strategy. So it could hold down prices p to the minimum possible level () and ration access
to deserving individuals. For example, a university might care that students from disadvantaged
5A third possible social objective could be related to paternalism, e.g., in markets where consumers face behavioral
or informational issues. Although this has been popularized recently by behavioral economics, the idea is much older
and is related to Musgrave (1959)s concept of merit goods. In this case, the rm must weigh up the ethics of exploiting
its information or the frailties of consumers against making a prot.
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backgrounds are admitted or a hospital may value medical care being made available to poor patients.
The second type of social objective is in the nature of externalities associated with the goods
production. For example, environmental externalities may arise requiring rms to trade o¤ cost
e¢ ciency against social costs of pollution. Suppose a rm can choose between two technologies that
di¤er in costs ( and  with  >  > 0) but with the costlier technology associated with lower
pollution levels. Then the rms choice would be to decide whether it is worth giving up prots by
choosing the costlier technology if the environmental benets that external to the rm are substantial
enough.
In both of these cases, the payo¤ related to the social objective is likely to be non-rival. To the
extent the founder and the manager both care about it (in addition to other citizens who are not
directly involved), they too receive a non-pecuniary payo¤. This contrasts with the standard agency
framework where rewards are pecuniary, and therefore, rivalrous.
Another feature of these examples is that it is plausible to think that factors that drive the
decisions made by rms are subject to private information. For example, only the manager may
have access to information that makes it possible to judge whether an individual is truly deserving
of preferential treatment, or whether in a given project, the environmental costs of using the default
low cost technology are high or not. What is key is that the production or the distribution of the
good has a potential conict between prots and social objectives, and yet the underlying reason for
making a decision is not observed by the founder or the wider group of stakeholders.
Below, we study how rms handle the trade-o¤ in a decentralized way using organizational design,
and selection of intrinsically motivated managers. The social payo¤will be generated (stochastically)
as a joint by-product in the production or allocation of the private good or service. i.e. there is no
way of separating the social outcome from the production or allocation of this good. This rules out
alternative and equivalent ways of achieving the same social objective, either through government
action (e.g., public provision or regulation) or through private initiative (e.g., the manager and the
founder donating their time or money to a charity).
The trade-o¤between private and social costs and benets is a classic problem in public economics
and is usually dealt with the instruments of taxes and subsidies. Similarly, agency problems within
an organization is dealt with through incentive schemes and aspects of organization design (such as
delegation). In the setting we look at, these two sets of problems are intertwined - the desirability
of sacricing prots for the social objective is state-contingent and only the decision-maker observes
the state.
Decisions The manager has two decisions to make. The rst is e¤ort, e 2 [e; 1] where e  0, and
the second is an action x 2 f0; 1g relating to balancing prot considerations with the social objective
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(e.g., the decision to preferentially allocate the good to a consumer or the choice of technology).
The choice of e¤ort is as in standard agency models, with greater e¤ort leading to higher likelihood
of both prots and the social payo¤. E¤ort is modelled as a continuous choice with greater e¤ort
creating a shift in the distribution of payo¤s in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
Let c (e) be the cost of e¤ort. It is assumed to have the standard properties: it is strictly
increasing and strictly convex. We also assume that c000 (e) > 0.6 This ensures that the marginal
cost of eliciting e¤ort is increasing.
The choice of x is a binary decision that a¤ects how far social payo¤s are prioritized relative to
prots. The action has no utility cost. The choice x = 1 is the pro-social action, where prots
are sacriced for the social objective, and x = 0 is the commercial prot-maximizing action. The
choice of x will be subject to what we call the mission-integrity problem - is the managers decision
consistent with the social mission of the rm.
Timeline, States, and Payo¤s After the manager is recruited, she chooses e and this stochasti-
cally determines which of two states r 2 fL;Hg occurs where r = H occurs with probability e and
r = L occurs with probability (1  e). The state r refers to the potential overall (pecuniary and
non-pecuniary) surplus that the rm is able to generate. Let z denote the reward from high e¤ort to
the manager in the state r = H, which includes nancial as well as any non-pecuniary payo¤. Since
the probability of r = H is e, we can dene the managers choice of e as:
e^ (z) = arg max
e2[e;1]
fze  c (e)g : (1)
Let the managers indirect utility function be denoted as:
 (z) = ze^ (z)  c (e^ (z)) : (2)
After the realization of r , which the manager observes, there is a further state s 2 fh; lg which
is realized with q 2 (0; 1) being the probability of state h: This state a¤ects the relative desirability
of x = 0 and x = 1 in a way that we make precise below. The realization of state s is independent
of the actions of the agent. After s is realized, which the manager observes, he chooses x unless it is
contractually specied to be either always 0 or always 1. After this the outcomes are realized.
The outcomes depend on the states (r; s) and the choice of action (x) by the manager. They
consist of two outputs, nancial prot to the rm (^), that takes two values,  > 0 and 0, and a
social payo¤, : The social payo¤ is the total value of the social payo¤ to society, that includes the
6This stronger condition is needed for only Propositions 2 and 4 below.
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manager, the founder, and all other citizens. Instead of the total social payo¤, notationally it will
be helpful to work with the average social payo¤ (i.e., the value of the social payo¤ to the average
citizen), denoted by . This is assumed to take three possible values, h; `; and 0 with h > l  0.
The social payo¤depends on the state of the world s 2 fh; lg : A "high" value social state is indicated
by s = h, and a "low" value social state by l.
Let there beN 2 citizens who are not involved in the rm as founders or managers but nonetheless
care about what it does. Let F  and M be the value of the social payo¤ to the founder and the
manager, so that the total number of "caring" citizens is N . We assume F and M are non-negative
and can possibly take a value higher than 1 (which can be interpreted as them caring about the
social objective more than the average for all caring citizens) but is bounded above by some real
number G > 0. Let i be the value of the social payo¤ to the i-th citizen (i = 1; 2; ::; N   2) where
i 2 [0; G]. In the special case where all citizens including the founder and the manager have the
same valuation, i = F = M = 1. Notice that, in general,  =

F + M +
PN
i=1 
i

 = N holds
by denition.
It is useful to relate the model to the two examples discussed above.
In the case where the rm is interested in enhancing access of some consumers, the social payo¤
arises if deserving consumers receive the good. If they receive the good at cost, i.e. p = ,
then consumers receive a net surplus of v   . This is a transfer from the rm to these deserving
consumers and so the sum total of consumer surplus and nancial prots to the rm remains the same
(equal to ) independent of the choice of x. However, society at large receives a positive payo¤when
these consumers belong to a deserving group. The social payo¤ varies depending on how deserving
the group is deemed to be. For example, the social payo¤ when a student gets free admission to a
school who comes from a very poor background could be h, while for a student from a not-so-poor
background it is l.
Now consider the second example where rms choose a production technology. In this case,
choosing x = 1 could be choosing a method of production which is more costly but has a positive
externality, for example, in terms of lower pollution. The private value generated by the good is v,
and the price charged is p = v. However, the cost of production takes two values,  and  with
 >  > 0. If the rm chooses x = 1, which means the cost of production is ; then nancial prots
are zero (assuming  = v) but a positive externality is generated. Unlike the previous example, here
the sum total of the consumer surplus and the nancial prots to the rm depend on the choice of x.
The value of the positive externality is state-contingent with s for s 2 fh; lg capturing the variation
in background factors which a¤ect the size of the benets from adopting a greener technology.
The following table summarizes the total social and nancial payo¤s for all (x; s; r) combinations:
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 With probability e, r = H and then the social decision problem is given by the following matrix:
x = 1 x = 0
s = h Nh 
s = ` N` 
 With probability 1  e, r = L, upon which the social decision problem is given by the following
matrix:
x = 1 x = 0
s = h 0 0
s = ` 0 0
That is, if r = H then it is feasible to generate a prot but this depends on the choice of x. In
particular, if x = 0 then prots are positive but there are no social payo¤s. But if x = 1 then prots
are zero, but depending on s, social payo¤s can be high or low. In particular, if s = h, which occurs
with probability q, choosing x = 1 yields h while if s = l, which occurs with probability 1   q,
choosing x = 1 yields `. If r = L , then only the low prot results independent of the action choice,
and there is also no scope for generating a positive social payo¤.
Let
 = qh + (1  q) `
denote the expected average social payo¤.
To simplify notation, let
s 
s

for s = h; l:
Correspondingly, let   

. This normalizes the average social payo¤s by the nancial payo¤ and
provides a unit-free measure of the relative importance of the social payo¤.
From the point of overall e¢ ciency, there are three possible cases. If the total social payo¤ in
state s = l exceeds the nancial payo¤, i.e., Nl >  or, lN > 1, then the e¢ cient decision is
to always choose x = 1. If the total social payo¤ in state s = h is lower than the nancial payo¤,
i.e., Nh <  or, hN < 1, then the e¢ cient decision is to always choose x = 0. In these cases, by
stipulating x = 1 or x = 0, the e¢ cient trade-o¤ between prot and social objective can be achieved
The interesting case that we will focus on is where
hN > 1 > lN:
This implies that in s = h, x = 1 should be chosen while for s = l, x = 0 should be chosen.
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Informational and Contracting Assumptions We assume that the states r and s are observed
only by the manager. Also, the managers e¤ort e too is private information, as in standard models
of moral hazard. In addition, the non-pecuniary social payo¤s s (s = h; l) are non-observable to
the founder, and hence, non-contractible. They are not directly experienced by the founder (or the
rest of society) during the time-frame of the contracting period and can be thought of as similar to a
credence good. It is the belief (which in equilibrium will be true in expected terms) that a deserving
student or patient was granted access, or that a technology adopted made a big di¤erence to reducing
pollution that generates these payo¤s. In contrast, the manager has the knowledge about the true
state of the world, and he therefore experiences the social payo¤ more directly.
The managers action choice x as well as nancial prots ( or 0) are assumed to be observable
and contractible. We also assume that the managers and the founders motivation (M and F ) are
public information.7
We assume that there are no constraints on (nancial) residual claimancy (e.g., risk-aversion or
limited liability). This is for reasons of parsimony, namely, to minimize the number of departures
from the rst-best world, and also, tractability.8 All through, we assume that the founder makes a
xed up-front transfer T to the manger (which can also be negative).
Citizen-Managers We use the term citizen-manager to capture the idea of a manager who is a
motivated agent in the sense of Besley and Ghatak (2005), i.e. may care directly about the social
payo¤.9 This will play a key role in achieving mission integrity in a social enterprise. There is a
pool of potential managers who have some expertise not necessarily possessed by all citizens who care
about the social objective. They are drawn from a subset of all citizens. Potential managers di¤er in
terms of how much they value the social payo¤. A manager of type j derives a payo¤ of Mj  from
the outcome related to the social objective (recall that  is the average social payo¤). Each manager
has an outside option, uj.10 We will drop the subscript j when referring to an individual manager
for the remainder of this section to simplify notation.
Founders (Social Entrepreneurs) We think of founders as entrepreneurs who endow the rm
with a constitution (an organizational form) which could specify a rigid mission and recruit managers
to run the rm on their behalf. Even if he delegates running the organization, the founder retains
rights over the idea or technology or the brand that is created which allows her to choose the
7We discuss relaxing this in a footnote in section 5.
8The assumptions that everyone is risk neutral and there are no transferability constraints also simplies the analysis
of the matching problem studied in section 5 below.
9See also Francois (2000) and Delfgauuw and Dur (2010) for models which make use of selection arguments with
motivated agents.
10This can determined endogenously in a competitive recruitment process as modeled in section ve below.
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organizational form although he has no direct control over the management of the organization.
The core case on which we focus is where F  0, i.e. the founder values the pro-social mission of
the enterprise. This means that we are in a common-interest environment rather than the standard
conict of interest setting of agency theory which here corresponds to F < 0. If a founder who cares
solely about nancial prot F = 0 hires a manager who cares about a pro-social mission M > 0,
then he can still potentially protby allowing the manager to indulge his pro-social preference as
long as this lowers the cost of hiring the manager su¢ ciently.
The Contracting Problem There are two main agency problems in this framework: one type of
e¤ort a¤ects the total size of the pie, and the other one the composition of the pie in terms of social
and private payo¤s.
First, there is the possibility that the manager could be covering up his failure to get r = H by
appearing to pick the pro-social mission. Hence, if he observes x = 1, the founder would not know
whether the manager succeeded in making the rm protable (r = H) but chose to pursue the social
mission, or whether the manager failed (r = L), since in both cases observed nancial prot is zero.
Second, there is a need to ensure that the manager makes the right decision on the mission vs prot
trade-o¤. Thus, conditional on r = H, the founder wishes the manager to choose the right action
depending on the realization of s 2 fh; lg. Depending on the managers motivation, he may choose
prot over mission more or less often than the founder would like.
Since ^ and x are veriable, we permit contracts which depend on these variables. The key
contracting problems are to ensure mission-integrity, i.e., incentive-compatibility in the choice of x,
as well as providing incentives for e.11 While ^ and x take on two values each, conditional on x = 1,
^ = 0 in all states of the world and conditional on x = 0, ^ =  or 0 depending on r = H or
L. Therefore, the founder gets to observe only one of the following three possible pairs of (x; ^):
(1; 0) ; (0; 0), and (0; ). It therefore su¢ ces to restrict attention to three possible payments to the
manager b10; b00, and b0 where bx^  b(x; ^):To ensure mission-integrity in state r = H the following
inequalities need to hold:
b10 + 
Mh  b0  b10 + Ml
or,
Mh  b0   b10  Ml:
This implies that b0   b10  0: In state r = L, there is no mission-integrity problem and the
manager gets paid b10 or b00 depending on whether he chooses x = 1 or 0. Suppose   b0 b10 is the
11What we call the mission integrity problem can be reformulated as a multi-tasking model, as pointed out by
Holmström and Milgrom (1991) in a di¤erent but related context (footnote 11).
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prot-share of the manager. Then the mission-integrity constraints can be written as

h
 M  
l
:
Assuming that mission-integrity is achieved (i.e., x = 1 when s = h, and x = 0 when s = l), the
managers expected payo¤ is
UM = e

q
 
b10 + 
Mh

+ (1  q) b0
	
+ (1  e) maxfb10;b00g   c (e) + T:
Correspondingly, the founders expected payo¤ is
UF = e

qfFh   b10g+ (1  q) (   b0)
  (1  e) maxfb10;b00g   T:
As we noted above, the xed payment T can be positive or negative.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to b10  b00 since a high value of b00 can only
hurt e¤ort incentives while having no role in ensuring mission-integrity. In that case, the choice of e
is given by e^
 
q
 
b10 + 
Mh

+ (1  q) b0   b10

, or, e^
 
qMh + (1  q) (b0   b10)

: The highest
value of (b0   b10) that is consistent with mission-integrity is Mh, yielding an e¤ort level of
e^(Mh): As b0 and b10 correspond to prot realizations of  and 0, if b0   b10 >  then the
manager will have more than 100% marginal nancial incentives and may "fake" nancial success
(e.g., borrow  from outside) and we therefore restrict ourselves to b0 b10  . Hence, for Mh > 1,
and mission integrity is satised with full residual claimancy (b0   b10 = ) so long as Ml  1.
The founder may not always wish to ensure a state-contingent exible choice of x and may settle
for either x = 1 or x = 0 in all states of the world.
First, choosing x = 1 may be preferable if allowing for a exible action choice is too costly in
terms of e¤ort incentives. For example, if Mh is close to 0 (because the manager is unmotivated)
then e^(Mh) would be low and the founder may prefer not to ensure mission-integrity and give the
manager full residual claimancy, i.e., set b0 =  and b10 = 0. Second, the founder might care a lot
about the social objective (F is high) and therefore, independent of the managers motivation, may
prefer x = 1 in all states of the world. In this case, the founder can simply stipulate x = 1. Third,
if F < 0 then the founder disapproves of the social objective which is valued by the manager, and
may prefer a for-prot organization where he can constrain the manager to choose x = 0. Indeed,
the inability of managers in rms to pursue non-prot objectives is a dening feature of the standard
model of the corporation and its obligation, enshrined in law, to pursue shareholder value.
Suppose x = 1 is contractually stipulated ex ante. Then in all states of the world, observed prots
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will be 0 and the observed action choice will be x = 1. Therefore, the manager will get a at pay
of b10 (in principle, which can be negative), so that we can set T = 0. The expected payo¤s of the
manager and the founder will be:
UM = eM + b10   c (e)
UF = eF   b10:
In this case, the contracting problem is simple: the choice of e¤ort is e^
 
M

and given the
reservation payo¤ u of the manager, b10 = u  
 
M

.
Suppose instead that x = 0 is agreed upon ex ante. Then in all states of the world, observed
prots will be  or 0, and the observed action choice will be x = 0. Therefore, the manager will get
a variable pay of b0 or b00 contingent on x = 0 and ^ =  or 0. The expected payo¤s of the manager
and the founder in this case will be:
UM = eb0 + (1  e) b00   c (e) + T
UF = e (   b0)  (1  e) b00   T:
In this case too, the contracting problem is simple. Given that it is a transferable utility setting,
the manager should be made full residual claimant to achieve an e¢ cient choice of e. The following
contract would achieve it: b0 = ; b00 = 0, and T = u    (). This would yield an e¤ort level of
e^ ().
Organizational Forms To relate the optimal contracting approach above to the choice of orga-
nizational form, we allow organizations to vary in two dimensions. The rst of these is whether
the founder stipulates ex ante the action choice a¤ecting the trade-o¤ between social mission and
prots. That is, organizations will di¤er in terms of whether the manager has the authority to
choose x or whether it is xed by the founder. Second, the degree to which the manager is nancially
incentivized. In the subsequent analysis, for simplicity, we assume that rather than  taking any
continuous value between 0 and 1, can only take two discrete values: 0 or 1: That is, we restrict
attention to organizational forms where either the manager is a full residual claimant or has a at
payo¤. Allowing the manager to be a partial residual-claimant would expand the parameter range
for which social enterprises (described below) would be preferred, but does not signicantly change
the main conclusions. We will return to this issue in the next section when we discuss the results.
We will focus on three organizational forms:
(i) (FP) a for-prot with a rigid mission of prot-maximization (x = 0) but managers are full
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(nancial) residual claimants. In this case, M is irrelevant since all rewards to managers are in the
form of private consumption. We assume that the manager is made a residual claimant on prot.
Hence, she will put in e¤ort e^ () and her expected payo¤ will be  () + T .
(ii) (NP) a non-prot with a rigid pro-social mission (x = 1) and managers are paid a at wage.12
Managers will be motivated to put in e¤ort only in so far as they value the social payo¤s. Hence
e¤ort will be e^
 
M

, i.e. e¤ort now depends on how far the manager values the mission. Her
expected payo¤ will be 
 
M

+ T .
(iii) (SE) a social enterprise where the citizen-manager has control rights over the action and so may
choose whether to earn a prot or pursue a social purpose and is a full (nancial) residual claimant.
Thus, the social enterprise is a hybrid where there is scope for a exible trade-o¤ between the pro-
social mission and prot. In terms of the optimal contracting approach, in a SE mission integrity is
satised. The action choice in a social enterprise will therefore be:
x^
 
M ; s

= arg max
x2f0;1g

Msx+ [1  x]
	
 for s 2 fh; lg
=
8<: 1 if M  1s0 otherwise.
Let v
 
M
 Ps2fh;lg qs x^  M ; s Ms + (1  x^  M ; s)  where qh = q and ql = 1  q. It is the
expected payo¤ (social and nancial) when the state is r = H. Then e¤ort will be e^
 
v
 
M

and
the expected payo¤ of the manager is 
 
v
 
M

+ T .
In each case, managers receive a xed payment from (or, make a payment to) the organizations
founder to run the rm, T , which is pinned down by the outside option. The sign of T is not known a
priori. In a for-prot rm, we would typically expect the founder to license the product to a manager
in exchange for a royalty payment so that T < 0. In a non-prot rm, it would be necessary for the
manager to be paid to run the rm where T > 0 is a grant or the returns to an endowment which
makes the rm viable. However, managers may also be willing to work below their marketprice if
they are committed to the cause being pursued by the rm; they could either work for free or donate
to the organization.13
We are identifying SEs as organizations where incentive-compatibility is satised in terms of
action choice regarding the prot vs mission trade-o¤ by giving the manager control rights over the
12Our model of non-prot organization follows the literature in emphasising how a non-distribution constraint ensures
that the non-prot mission is not compromised for private gain (e.g., Hansmann, 1980, and Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001).
Here, it ensures that the enterprise is never tempted to choose a highly protable course of action at the expense of
the mission.
13When we consider competition and matching below, the level of T will be determined endogenously by the need
to attract managers to run the rm in a competitive market setting.
15
action choice. Alternatively, we can think of SEs as organizations where the founder stipulates a
state-contingent action choice, and because it is incentive compatibile, is delivered by the manager.
We are identifying FP as organizations where mission integrity is not satised and the manager has
full (nancial) residual claimancy. This could be because the founder chooses a rigid mission (for
example, when F < 0). Alternatively, the founder may not stipulate a rigid mission, but given the
type of the manager (low but positive values of M) chooses not to induce mission-integrity. Similarly,
a NP is an organization where mission integrity is not satised but the manager has zero (nancial)
residual claimancy. This could be because the founder chooses a rigid mission (for example, when
F is positive and large). Alternatively, the manager may have the formal control rights over the
mission, but given that he puts some weight on the social mission (M  0), will always choose the
pro-social mission.
In our analysis, the type of the manager plays an important role in driving organizational choice.
If all managers had the same type (say, M = 0, as typically assumed in the literature on non-
prots) then the only contracting instruments would be the degree of residual claimancy and control
rights over the action choice. Given heterogeneous types of managers, the need for the founder to
choose a rigid mission would only arise in the case of non-alignment of preferences (e.g., x = 0 when
F < 0 and M > 0 and x = 1 when F > 0 and high, and M small). In other cases, given the
type of the manager, formal and real authority in the choice of x are going to be equivalent given
incentive-compatibility.
4 Comparing Organizational Forms
We begin by looking at e¤ort choices. We then compare welfare.
Let z be the expected payo¤ to the manager conditional on r = H. This will typically be a
combination of nancial and non-pecuniary payo¤s as discussed above. The expected payo¤ of the
manager is therefore
UM =  (z) + T
and the choice of e¤ort is given by e^ (z) . We begin with a simple but useful observation. The proof
of this and subsequent results are in the Appendix.
Observation 1: The larger is the expected payo¤ of the manager ( z) conditional on
success ( r = H), the greater is her e¤ort and the higher is her ex ante expected payo¤.
The proof follows directly from the properties of  (z) and e^ (z). It reects the standard logic of
residual claimancy in promoting e¤ort incentives. That said, it is important to bear in mind that z
could include, wholly or partly, the non-pecuniary payo¤ from pursuing a pro-social mission.
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Action and E¤ort Choices The action choice is relevant only in a social enterprise. For M 2
[; ] where   1
h
< 1 and   1
l
> 1, a managers social payo¤ is more important than prots
when r = H and s = h and vice versa when r = H and s = l. Hence,
Observation 2: In a social enterprise the action choice depends on M . Managers with
M 2 ;  choose state contingent actions, those with M   choose x = 1 while those
with M <  choose x = 0:
This emphasizes that although a social enterprise always has the possibility of a exible trade-o¤,
whether this is realized depends on the kind of citizen-manager in place. Observation 2 implies that,
for any given level of founder valuation, F , if social enterprises are at all chosen, it will be for
managers with M 2 ; . Otherwise, there is nothing a social enterprise can do that cannot be
mimicked by a for-prot or a non-prot where x = 0 or x = 1 is stipulated ex ante. The motivation
of the manager and the exibility that is granted to them under a social enterprise has an immediate
and interesting implication in terms of e¤ort choice of managers:
Proposition 1 The e¤ort level in a social enterprise is (weakly) higher than in a for-prot or a
non-prot, and strictly so for M 2  ; , when it is the chosen organizational form. Moreover,
there exists ^  1

such that e¤ort is higher (lower) in a for-prot than a non-prot for M < ^
(M > ^).
E¤ort is higher in a social enterprise precisely because of the discretion over action choice that a
exible mission permits. By decentralizing this to a manager, the founder empowers him to choose
the action that will maximize his payo¤ conditional on success, and this gives the best incentives to
put in e¤ort. When M 2  ; , in a social enterprise, conditional on success (r = H) the managers
expected payo¤ is higher than that of non-prots or for-prots, and due to this complementarity,
she puts in more e¤ort.14 This result reects the important role of intrinsic motivation (M) and
heterogeneity in it in driving organizational choice and providing e¤ort incentives. However, e¤ort
incentives on the part of the manager is only one part of the story, and to understand organizational
choice, the value the founder puts on the social objective plays an important role, an issue to which
we turn now.
Organization Choice We now consider which organizational form is optimal once we take the
founders valuation into account. The founders expected payo¤ is
UF =

qfxhFh + (1  xh)g+ (1  q) fx`F` + (1  xl)g

   T:
14Notice that if the choice was restricted between NP and FP only, then the critical value of M such that a manager
is indi¤erent is M = ^ which lies between  and , and FP preferred for M < ^ and NP preferred for M > ^.
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where xs (s 2 f`; hg) is the action taken by the manager in state s. As we noted above, the xed
payment T can be positive or negative.
The joint surplus of each organizational form factoring in both the founders valuation of the
social payo¤ and the citizen-managers payo¤ is given by:
SFP
 
F ; M

=  ()
SNP
 
F ; M

= Fe^
 
M

+ 
 
M

SSE
 
F ; M

= F
0@ X
s2fh;lg
qsx^
 
M ; s

s
1A e^  v  M+   v  M :
We ignore the consumer surplus from these calculations, since it is present in all cases and does not
a¤ect the comparative analysis. We also ignore the payo¤ of the rest of the society. For now, we take
the matching of founders and managers as given, relaxing this in the next section.
To maximize joint surplus, the action in state s should be governed by whether
 
M + F

s ? 1.
However, due to informational constraints, the choice is governed solely by managers preferences (in
a social enterprise) or can be rigidly stipulated (in a for-prot or a non-prot). The selection of a
manager with a specic M along with an organizational form are the two instruments at the disposal
of the founder to inuence action choice as well as e¤ort.
Earlier we compared e¤ort across organizational forms. However, e¤ort is one of the key consid-
erations in choosing a particular organizational form. If the founder did not value the social payo¤
(F = 0), then e¤ort would be the only consideration since the managers payo¤ is monotonically
increasing in e¤ort and given there are no constraints on transfers between the manager and the
founder. In particular, organizational choice would reect the ranking in terms of e¤ort. If the
founder does value the social payo¤ (F > 0) then that constitutes the other key consideration in
organizational choice and can potentially overturn the ranking implied by e¤ort. This follows from
the fact that the social payo¤ is non-rival between the founder and the manager and this feature can
potentially go against the intuition of what we would expect from standard contracting problems
where payo¤s are typically rivalrous (even when non-pecuniary).15
The Case for Social Enterprise We will now look at two dimensions of the environment. To
begin with, we will look at how heterogeneity in the types of the founder and manager a¤ects whether
a social enterprise yields the highest social surplus. We will then look at how the choice of a social
enterprise varies with the likelihood that the commercial or social state is realized (variation in q).
15See, for example, Besley and Ghatak (2001) that study the optimal ownership structure of assets in the context
of public goods.
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In each case, we will illustrate this with quantitative simulations of the gains.
A. Variation in Founder and Manager Motivation First we consider what happens as we
vary the motivation of the founder and manager. In comparing organizational forms, we consider the
critical levels of founder motivation, for a given level of manager motivation which make a particular
organizational form optimal. We dene the parameter space relative to a non-prot being optimal.
Thus, for M  , let us dene  FP
 
M

such that SFP
 
 ; M

= SNP
 
 ; M

, i.e. as the switch
point above which a non-prot yields greater total surplus when the manager would always prefer to
pursue a for-prot mission. And for M 2  ; , dene  SE  M from SSE   ; M = SNP   ; M,
as the switch point above which a non-prot yields higher total surplus when a manager in a social
enterprise will choose a state-contingent mission. Using these denitions, we have the following key
result:
Proposition 2
1. For low levels of manager motivation (M 2 [0; ]) a for-prot yields the same surplus as a
social enterprise and is preferred to a non-prot if the level of founder motivation is below
 FP (
M) > 0, a function that is strictly decreasing in M , with  FP (0) > 1 and  FP () >

h
1  
h
i
:
2. For middle levels of manager motivation (M 2  ; ) a social enterprise strictly dominates a
for-prot and is preferred to a non-prot if the level of founder motivation is below  SE(M) > 0;
a function that is strictly decreasing, with  SE() > 0 =  SE().
3. For high levels of manager motivation (M  ) a non-prot yields the same surplus as a social
enterprise, and both of these organizational forms dominate a for-prot for all F  0:
This proposition characterizes organizational choice as a function of the levels of founder and
manager motivation. Manager motivation matters because it a¤ects which action related to the
mission vs prot trade-o¤ will be chosen, and e¤ort. The founders motivation matters because it
trades o¤ the gains from e¤ort incentives for the manager with the value put on the social payo¤.
For a given level of the founders motivation, the higher is M , the more likely a social enterprise
will be chosen over a for-prot, and a non-prot will be chosen over a social enterprise.
On the other hand, for a given level of the managers motivation, the higher is F , the more likely
a non-prot will be chosen over a for-prot or a social enterprise. Existing theories of non-prots
correspond in our framework to the case where manager motivation is low, and the choice is between
a non-prot or a for-prot and the former is preferred when the founder is su¢ ciently motivated.
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This is based on the logic of the multi-tasking model - for-prots have higher e¤ort due the manager
being incentivized, but sacrice the social payo¤, and if these are big enough to the founder, she will
choose a non-prot despite e¤ort being lower.16
We show that for moderate levels of manager motivation, a social enterprise can be optimal as
long as the manager will choose the correct action as e¤ort will be higher than both for-prots
and non-prots. Therefore, even if the founder does not care much about the social cause, a social
enterprise will be preferred to a for-prot. Of course, if the founder cares a lot about the social cause,
then a non-prot will be chosen.
There is a complementarity between founder and manager motivation since a more motivated
manager puts in greater e¤ort which lessens the e¢ ciency loss in a non-prot. When managers are
highly motivated, then motivated founders always choose a non-prot form. We examine this issue
in detail in section 5, where we study matching.
We now illustrate the two switch lines in Proposition 2 for the case of constant elasticity of e¤ort,
using the cost of e¤ort function c (e) = 1
1+1=
e(1+
1
). The constant elasticity of e¤ort is , which is
assumed to be positive and less than one (given our assumption c000(e) > 0). It is readily veried that
in this case, e^(z) = z and (z) = 1
+1
z+1.
Fixing q = 1=2, we have:
 SE
 
M

=
1
1+
h 
M 
1+      M1+iP
s2f`;hg
x^(M ;s)s
2
( (M))     M 
where 
 
M
 Ps2f`;hg x^(M ;s)Ms+[1 x^(M ;s)]2 and
 FP
 
M

=
1
1+
h
1   M 1+i 
M 
  :
In terms of our earlier notation 
 
M

=
v(M)

for the case q = 1
2
.
We will illustrate this for a range M 2 [0:8; 1:2]. We set h = 1:10 and ` = 0:90: A large
number of studies that suggest that a reasonable number for  is 0.2.17 There are three ranges of
M corresponding to Proposition 2. For M < , the social enterprise and for-prot yield the same
16Previous discussions of the merits of for-prot and non-prot enterprise such as Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) have
focused on the case where managers are not motivated, i.e. M = 0. As we have already stressed, there is no role for
social enterprise in this case in our setting since there is no way of achieving the exible mission which is the hallmark
of balancing prots with purpose. Moreover, for a non-prot to be a good idea we would have to allow for a lower
bound on e¤ort or, the social output to be somewhat more contractible.
17See, for example, Bandiera et al (2007) in the context of a eld experiment. As noted in Prendergast (2013) it is
also consistent with the ndings in the literature on taxation and labor supply.
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outcome. This is the blue line in Figure 1. For F high enough, there is a case for a non-prot over
a social enterprise/ for-prot. However, as M decreases, e¤ort goes down and so for low values of
M a non-prot is not a good idea unless F is very high.
In the range M 2 ; , a social enterprise strictly dominates a for-prot because the manager
puts in a higher e¤ort given his ability to choose the mission-related action. As in the rst range, for
high enough values of F , non-prots dominate social enterprise, and the higher is M the lower is
the relevant threshold, since even under a non-prot, e¤ort is not too low. This threshold is given by
the red line. For high values of M (M  ) non-prots and social enterprise are equivalent since the
manager always chooses the pro-social action. To summarize, Figure 1 maps out clearly the space
in which a social enterprise is desirable where founders care for social returns but not su¢ ciently
enough to make foregoing prots in all cases worthwhile.
B. Variation in the Likelihood of the High Social State We now consider how varying
the probability that the high value social state occurs (q) changes the case for a social enterprise
versus a non-prot (as the joint surplus from for-prots does not depend on q, it is left out of the
comparison). The core trade o¤ between a social enterprise and a non-prot is clear: e¤ort is higher
in the former but compared to the latter, the founder misses out on the social payo¤whenever s = l.
When q = 1, a non-prot and a social enterprise have the same joint surplus, while for q = 0, non-
prots have strictly lower surplus than social enterprises (which in turn is the same as for-prots). In
general, as q increases, the surplus under both non-prots and social enterprise goes up but to make
the comparison between the two tractable, we need to make some simplifying assumptions. We take
the case where M = F = 1, i.e. the manager will pick the rightstate-contingent action in a social
enterprise and the manager and founder have the same preference over prots and mission (which is
the same as that of the average citizen). We also take the case of constant elasticity of e¤ort, .
Let SNP (1; 1)  S^NP and SSE (1; 1)  S^SE: Let ~  qh + (1  q), so that v(1) = ~. Note also
that ~ > : It is now straightforward to check that social surplus in a non-prot is
S^NP =
2 + 
1 + 
 

1+
1+
and in a social enterprise is
S^SE =

2 + 
1 + 

~
1+
  (1  q)

~

1+:
Intuitively we know that for social enterprise to yield signicant gains relative to non-prots, q
cannot be too large. However, the di¤erence in the surplus under the two organizational forms, and
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how it changes with respect to q depends on the size of l (e.g., if l is relatively high, the loss from
non-prots is relatively low, independent of q) and how elastic is e¤ort (), since as q changes, e¤ort
responds under both organizational forms. The observation below o¤ers su¢ cient conditions for
social enterprises to have higher surplus than non-prots for all values of q and for this di¤erence to
be monotonically decreasing as q increases: so long as l is not too high, and the e¤ect via changes
in e¤ort is not signicant (which is true if  is small).
Observation 3: Suppose M = F = 1 ; and c (e) = 1
1+1=
e(1+
1
). If l  12 and  is
small, S^SE   S^NP  0 for all q 2 [0; 1], strictly so for q < 1, and is strictly decreasing in
q.
This is intuitive: if the high social state is very likely, then non-prots are almost as good as
social enterprises and so we would expect the advantage of social enterprises to be for lower levels of
q. However, if l is large (say, close to 1), then non-prots are almost as good as social enterprises
for all values of q and therefore, the advantage of social enterprises will be higher the lower is l.
To sum up, while Proposition 2 characterized organizational choice in terms of the pro-social
motivation of the founder and the manager, Observation 3 shows that under certain reasonable
conditions, the advantage of SE over NP is decreasing in the likelihood of the high social state.
To give a quantitative illustration, we set h = 1:2; i.e. a 20% gain in social returns when the
state is h, and consider three cases where we vary `. The percentage gain from a social enterprise
relative to a non-prot are given by  (q; h; l; ) =
S^SE
S^NP
  1. As in the previous quantitative
exercise, we set  = 0:2. There are three cases we consider in terms of values of l: low (0:3);
medium (0:4) and high (0:5): This illustration is given in Figure 2 where we have plotted the gains
for the entire range of q 2 [0; 1] for these three cases. As expected, the gure shows that the relative
e¢ ciency of a social enterprise is most when q is far below one. For the highest value of `, the gains
are small at about 5% for q  0:6. However, when ` is 0:3 the gains are much more substantial,
e.g., about 60% when q  0:2. While only illustrative, it does show the possibility of non-trivial
social benets from having the kind of exible mission allowed by a social enterprise. However, the
magnitude of the gains is contingent on the nature of the magnitude of the trade-o¤ between prot
and social purpose.
The Case for a For-Prot Above we mentioned that if F < 0 then there is a potential case for
a for-prot. This allows us to complete the picture in the sense that all organizational forms that we
considered can be optimal. If M = 0, then a for-prot is always optimal when F = 0. However,
the more interesting possibility is where M > 0. The attraction to a founder with F < 0 of hiring
a motivated manager is that he gets e¤ort from that manager who is also willing to take a pay cut
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or o¤er a higher franchise fee to the founder to run the rm. This must be traded-o¤ against the
way that such founders view the rm as causing pollutionwhen F < 0 and xs = 1. For example,
when M  = 1, the e¤ort level under a non-prot is the same as in a for-prot but the overall surplus
in a NP is lower, since the expected payo¤ from success (
 
M + F

) is lower than that under
for-prots () as F < 0.
Thus, for for-prots to be potentially attractive in this range relative to non-prots, the critical
value of F would have to be negative. This can be viewed as a representation in our framework of the
classic conict of interest that has been in the focus of agency problems due to managerial discretion.
In this case, the founder/owner of a rm wishes to discourage such "rent-seeking" behavior since
picking xs = 1 is a form of managerial indulgence at the expense of the founder.18 We record this
as:
Proposition 3 For any M > 0 a for-prot will dominate a non-prot or a social enterprise if F is
su¢ ciently negative.
This result highlights how our core theory of social enterprise is based on positive mutual gains
from picking a pro-social action. Otherwise, the basic agency problem of how to align the preferences
of the manager and the founder crops up. That said, F has to be su¢ ciently negative to overcome
the possibility that a founder wishes to exploit the fact that M > 0 since he can prot by leasing or
selling the rm to the manager in exchange for a higher price, or pay him a lower wage.
In Figure 3, we illustrate Proposition 3 using the same parameter values that we assumed for
Figure 1. We expand Figure 3 compared to Figure 1 to encompass negative values of F . For the
sake of comparison, we focus on the ranges of M such that for-prots are never chosen if F  0,
i.e., the second and the third of the three regions in Figure 1. Figure 3 illustrates the critical range
of F < 0 for which a for-prot is better than a social enterprise and/or non-prot. There is a
jump in the switch line at a point at which a nonprot and a social enterprise converge. This is
because we always have a pro-social mission in a social enterprise/non-prot and hence the for-prot
has an additional advantage since it generates  instead of l half of the time (recall that we have
set q = 1=2 in this illustration). However as M increases, this advantage diminishes since a non-
prot/social enterprise produces more e¤ort so the switch continues to slope downwards as a function
of M .
Government Action? A more subtle possibility arises by considering what happens if the
social cause can also be pursued through government action, as in the standard public economics
literature. This also bears on Milton Friedmans well-known critique of corporate social responsibility
18See, for example, Tirole (2006).
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(see Friedman (1970)). He argues that government should take responsibility for regulating public
goods and bads, leaving rms to focus on prot maximization. This argument might be extended to
cast doubt on any kind of rm that tries to take a more pro-social stance to doing business as in our
model of social enterprise.
To explore this, we return to the models core set-up to observe that the socially optimal strategy
for the rm should be governed by whether
s 
>
<1,
i.e. where the payo¤ of the full range of stakeholders, and not just founders and managers is taken
into account. Were the government able to chose xs and if s were observable, then the government
would choose a state contingent regulation to achieve mission integrity. However, this would not
necessarily bring forth the right level of e¤ort if the government could not set e directly the classic
e¤ort moral hazard problem. To do this, the government would have to monetize the social surplus
and reward the rm based on
PN
i=1 is, i.e. transfer the social surplus to the rm as an additional
prot. Thus rms would give their managers nancial incentives which monetize social returns a
form of Pigouvian subsidy in this context. In terms of our concrete examples this would be like a
government grant for picking deserving consumers and/or picking a green technology.
However, since s is private information, this is not a feasible option. That said, this issue is only
binding when there is a government that wishes to implement a exible mission, i.e.
h  > 1 > l :
Otherwise, the government would be able to introduce a regulation to mandate either x = 1 or x = 0.
For some kinds of externalities we do see this approach being taken.
Our model makes clear that achieving the optimal social trade-o¤with a social enterprise will only
work when there is a manager-founder pair who implement the socially optimal trade-o¤ between
prots and purpose. There is no guarantee that this will be the case when a private rm takes this
decision in a decentralized manner. This makes clear why social enterprises as envisaged here will
not necessarily achieve what a benevolent government would ideally like. Thus, we expect social
enterprise to be most e¤ective only when the interest in the decision by the rest of society
PN
i=1 i is
relatively small relative to what the insiders, i.e. founder and manager, desire. This is a case where
the cause is closer to being of local rather than a national interest where there is particular concern
about the issue among the founder and manager.
Thinking explicitly about interests outside of the rm also suggest how the model could be
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developed to allow citizens to inuence the mission of the rm directly, what Baron (2001) calls
private politics. This would work when the payo¤
PN
i=1 is would enter into the rms payo¤
through direct inuence as in the case of private lobbying. Whether this leads to better or worse
alignment between private and social preference depends exactly on which groups of citizens are
organized. It would also depend on whether founders of rms who appoint managers could anticipate
this by strategic delegation as in models of lobbying with citizen candidates such as Besley and Coate
(2001).
Robustness It is useful to consider what happens when change two aspects of the core formulation
of the model to be sure that the insights of the model are robust.
Allowing Partial Residual Claimancy The model restricts attention to managers to two
discrete alternatives:  2 f0; 1g. If we allow  to take any value between 0 and 1, then the mission-
integrity constraints can be written as: 
h
 M  
l
. Recalling that we dened a social enterprise
as one where the manager has authority to choose x and his prot-share is 1. We dened an interval
; 

where   1
h
and   1
l
such that managers for whom M lies in this interval, the mission
integrity constraints are satised. Substituting  = 1 above, this is veried.
We know that e¤ort incentives are increasing in . The highest value of  that is consistent with
mission-integrity is Mh, yielding an e¤ort level of e^(
Mh): Hence, for 
Mh > 1 (or, 
M > )
we have  = minf1; Mhg = 1 and mission integrity is satised with full residual claimancy so long
as M  . For M > ,   Ml can no longer be satised and the manager will always choose
x = 1, as we saw above.
Since this is a transferable utility set up, there is no cost to the founder of giving manager full
residual claimancy (which would not be the case if the manager was risk averse or there were limited
liability constraints, for example). Since e¤ort is increasing in ,  < 1 will only be chosen when
Mh < 1 or 
M <  because then  = minf1; Mhg = Mh: In the paper, since we restrict
attention to  = 1, mission-integrity cannot be satised when the manager has authority over action
choice, for M < . Allowing partial residual claimancy makes it possible to have mission integrity
in this parameter region. As a result, the parameter region for which social enterprise may expand.
However,  < 1 implies that e¤ort is lower in a social enterprise with partial residual claimancy
than in a for-prot and this modies one of core results. The same trade-o¤ that we saw between
for-prots and non-prots in the paper for the parameter zone M < , now also shows up between
for-prots and social enterprise (with partial residual claimancy). So this a second modication of
our core result.19
19In the limit, as M ! 0,  ! 0 and so social enterprise with partial residual claimancy approaches a pure
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Bounding the Weight Put on Pro-Social Motivation and Money In our core set-up,
when a manager cares more about social outcomes, he also cares more about overall about success.
We now investigate whether this could be driving the result that social enterprises elicit greater
managerial e¤ort. To investigate this, let managers now put a weight  on the social payo¤ and
(1  ) on money. Manager heterogeneity will now be in terms of . In a for-prot, a manager
receives (1  )  while in a non-prot he receives  fqh + (1  q) lg =  or, . With a social
enterprise, which has a exible mission and managerial autonomy, his expected payo¤ is
v^ () = qmax fh; (1  )g+ (1  q) max fl; (1  ) g :
For a social enterprise to dominate a for-prot, we now need that h  (1  ) , or   h+ =
1
h+1
 : Similarly, a for social enterprise to dominate a non-prot, we now need l  (1  ) ,
or,   
l+
= 1
l+1
 . Managers for whom  2 ;  choose state contingent actions, those with
   choose x = 1 while those with  <  choose x = 0: Also, the e¤ort level in a social enterprise is
(weakly) higher than in a for-prot or a non-prot, and strictly so for  2  ; , when it is the chosen
organizational form. Moreover, there exists ^  1
+1
such that e¤ort is higher (lower) in a for-prot
than a non-prot for  < ^ ( > ^), which corresponds to Proposition 1. What changes compared
to the core model is that e¤ort is increasing in  for non-prots, but decreasing in  for for-prots.
For a social enterprise, e¤ort is increasing or decreasing in  according to whether qh >< (1  q) .
In contrast, in the core model above, e¤ort in social-enterprises is increasing in manager motivation
(M), as is e¤ort in non-prots, while e¤ort in for-prots do not change with manager motivation.
The bottom line is that our result on e¤ort in social enterprises (when chosen) being higher than
that of either non-prots or for-prots for the same parameter range does not depend on the particular
formulation of managerial motivation. It is driven by the fact that in the relevant parameter range
for manager motivation, a social enterprise leads to an action choice which is the best in both states,
and the fact that there is a complementary between action and e¤ort choice in the managers payo¤
function.
5 Competition and Matching
Looking beyond exogenously matched founder-manager pairs, whether social enterprises as described
here can arise in a market setting depends on them being able to compete for workers against for-
prot and non-prot rms. We saw that there is a complementarity between founder and manager
motivation as the e¢ ciency loss in a non-prot from lower managerial e¤ort would be less, the more
non-prot as the managers motivation goes to 0.
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motivated the manager.
We now explore the logic of this. We model competition by considering matching of founders
and managers. The transfer from the founder to the manager, T , can adjust to ensure that, for a
given founder-manager pair, the most e¢ cient organizational form is chosen. Specically, we study a
market equilibrium where managers match with rms set up by founders who choose an organization
form.
We assume types of founders and managers to be observable and also, that preferences not to be
a¤ected by the type of the matched partner (e.g., M does not directly care about Fs type). We focus
on the implications of stable matching, dened as allocations of founders and managers which are
immune to a deviation in which any founder and manager can negotiate a choice of organizational
form and a payment which makes both of them better o¤. Were this not the case then we would
expect re-matching to occur. This approach can be thought of as the outcome of a competitive labor
market.
For simplicity, we focus on the case of three types of founders and managers, ranked in terms of how
much weight they put on the social mission. Let AF = ff0; f1; f2g denote the set of types of founders
and AM = fm0;m1;m2g be the set of types of managers. Following Roth and Sotomayor (1989),
the matching process can summarized by a one-to-one matching function  : AF [AM ! AF [AM
such that (i)  (fi) 2 AM [ ffig for all fi 2 AF (ii)  (mj) 2 AF [ fmjg for all mj 2 AM and (iii)
 (fi) = mj if and only if  (mj) = fi for all (fi;mj) 2 AF AM . A founder (manager) is unmatched
if  (fi) = f i( (mj) = mj). What this function does is to assign each founder (manager) to at most
one manager (founder) and allows for the possibility that a founder (manager) remains unmatched,
in which case he (she) is described as matched to himself (herself).
The founder and the manager types determine how much the cause is valued and are denoted by
F (f) and M (m) respectively. We assume that F (f0) = M (m0) = 0; M (m2) >  > M (m1) >
, and F (f2) > F (f1) > 0: This means that type m2 agents are strongly motivated and will always
choose the pro-social mission, while type m1 agents would achieve mission integrity only if they
worked in a social enterprise. Type m0 agents are completely neutral. The founders of type f2 and
f1 are motivated, the former more than the latter, but type f0 founders are neutral. We will abuse
notation slightly and refer to F (f ) = F and 
M(m) = 
M
 where  , 2 f0; 1; 2g, i.e. subscripts
now refer to the type.
The number of founders and managers of each type is denoted by N (f ) and n (m) respectively.
We study a population where N (f2) = n (m2) and N (f1) = n (m1), but N (f0) > n (m0). This puts
social enterprises and non-prots under maximum competitive pressure from for-prot rms who will
be seeking to recruit managers and will be willing to bid up managers wages to the point where
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expected prot is zero.
Associated with each possible match (f ;m) 2 AF  AM is a choice of organization form
J (f ;m) 2 fFP;NP; SEg and a transfer T (f ;m) when a founder of type f matches with a
manager of type m.
As we saw in Proposition 2, for matched pairs (F1 ; 
M
0 ) and (
F
2 ; 
M
0 ) either a for-prot or a
non-prot may be the best organizational form, depending on the value of  (M0 ) relative to 
F
1 and
F2 : Similarly, for the pairs (
F
1 ; 
M
1 ) and (
F
2 ; 
M
1 ) either a social enterprise or a non-prot may be
the optimal depending on the value of  SE(M1 ) relative to 
F
1 and 
F
2 :
However, the fact that there are some managers who would do what founders would like in a
social enterprise is not su¢ cient to guarantee that social enterprises would survive as part of a stable
matching model of market competition. Once rms have been founded, they need to be able to recruit
managers against competition from other forms of enterprises. We now give a condition under which
there is a stable assortative matching where selsh managers and founders match together in for-
prot rms, highly motivated founders and managers set up non-prot rms and those with middle
levels of motivation set up social enterprises.
Stable matching will require one further condition which guarantees that a non-prot organization
values a more motivated manager more than does a social enterprise for the same (positive) level
of founder motivation. For this, we need to ensure that e¤ort does not increase too much with
manager motivation in the range M 2 ;  because social enterprises have a strict advantage over
non-prots in terms of manager e¤ort in this range. A su¢ cient condition for this is given as part
of the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the elasticity of e¤ort at  is less than 
l
q(h l) , then the unique stable
matching equilibrium displays assortative matching, with (i) J (f0;m0) = FP ; (ii) J (f1;m1) = SE
if F1 <  SE
 
F1

and NP otherwise; and, (iii) J (f2;m2) = NP:
This result shows that social enterprises can emerge in a matching market against competition
from other organizational forms.20 This means that founders and managers have similar views
20Our assumption that c000 (e) > 0 implies that the marginal cost eliciting e¤ort is increasing, which in turn implies
that e^ (z) is increasing but concave in z, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2. Therefore, the elasticity of e¤ort
with respect to reward, namely, "^ (z)  ze^0(z)e^(z) ; is strictly less than 1. For Proposition 4, we require that
e^0
 


e^
 

 < l
q (h   l)
;
which is equivalent to
"^
 


<
l
q (h   l)
:
A su¢ cient condition for this assumption to hold is (
)l
q(h l) > 1 which is easy to verify in applications.
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about organizational goals, both preferring the exible mission which balances prots with purpose.
Within the specied range, having a more motivated manager is good for the prospect of having a
social enterprise since the e¤ort committed by the manager will be higher.21
This result also shows how allowing heterogeneity in manager and founder motivation and match-
ing provides predictions that are distinctive from existing theories of non-prots based on multi-
tasking arguments. For example, for managers with low levels of motivation, a motivated founder
will choose a non-prot, while founders with low motivation may set up a social enterprise or a
non-prot with managers who are motivated. However, if we allow for matching, the low motivation
manager and founder will pair up in a for-prot enterprise, while the more motivated manager and
founder will pair up in a social enterprise or non-prot.
6 Empirical Implications
The model identies social enterprises with middle range values of external benets and costs. For
goods that are associated with a large social externality (l high enough in our model) we should
always expect non-prots. For cases where the externality is small (but not necessarily zero),
we expect to see for-prots dominate. This implication could be empirically investigated, even
though comparing across organizational forms would be subject to the usual identication problems
associated with organizational form being endogenous. We would expect pure for-prots to have
higher nancial prots but a poorer record in terms of social objectives (e.g., pollution) compared
to social enterprises. Non-prots in turn would have better record in terms of social objectives that
social enterprise, but a worse record in terms of nancial e¢ ciency.
The model also gives a steer about which sector we should expect to see social enterprises emerge
in. Key to our argument is the social dimension being intrinsically bundled with the production of
the good. The decentralized information in rms is the key to this point rms know best what
the true social vs nancial cost-benet trade-o¤ associated with its decisions. Also, as noted above
21Our assumptions about the distribution of types of founders and managers implies that all the surplus will
accrue to managers. Therefore, type m0 agents receive T0 = SFP
 
F0 ; 
M
0

=  (), type m1 agents receive
T1 = max

SNP
 
F1 ; 
M
1

; SSE
 
F1 ; 
M
1
	
, and type m2 agents receive T2 = SNP
 
F2 ; 
M
2

: However, they do not
automatically ensure that self-selection constraints are satised for managers in an assortative matching equilibrium
if there is asymmetric information about managerstypes. To see this, suppose we start with an assortative matching
equilibrium, and then pull out the managers from two di¤erent organizational forms, say a NP with the pair (F2 ; 
M
2 )
and a SE with the pair (F1 ; 
M
1 ). If their identities are concealed, would they have an incentive to self-select back
into their existing positions? For this to happen both the following conditions need to hold:
SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F2 ; M1 )
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SSE(F1 ; M2 )
whereas assortative matching only implies that SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 ) + S
NP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SNP (F2 ; M1 ) + SSE(F1 ; M2 ).
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social enterprise will be more e¤ective when the insiders care a lot more about the social objective
than the rest of society. We would expect social enterprises to emerge in sectors where this is true,
namely when the cause is more local. If the costs and benets were known to third parties and/or
were of su¢ cient societal concern, then the externality could be taken care o¤ by having separate
action on the social dimension either by governments or non-prots.
Our approach also suggests that empirical explanations of social enterprises need to go beyond
standard considerations like incentives and legal rules, exploring the underlying preferences of those
who are attracted to work in such rms. Researchers have increasingly been aware of the role
of public service motivation in non-prots and government (see, for example, Dal Bo et al, 2013).
However, public service motivation tests could also be applied to managers in private rms which
try to balance prot with purpose. Investigating this further in social enterprises seems like an
important aspect of empirical research in this area if the ideas in the theory presented here are to be
taken seriously.
In related work, we have explored the possibility of directly testing some of the implications of
our model in the lab. In Besley, Ghatak, Marden, (2015), we report on a real e¤ort experiment to
simulate the e¤ort incentive problem. We asked participants to play three di¤erent games one where
they keep their earnings, one where they know that the earnings will be donated to a charity of their
choice, and the third one, where they have discretion over whether to keep the earnings themselves
or donate them to a charity of their choice. In the last one, we stochastically varied the amount of a
matching contribution we would make to charity conditional on the participant being successful, to
simulate the s = h and s = l states. We interpreted this game as corresponding to how we model
social enterprise. All individuals played all three games. Therefore, we were able to compare e¤ort
for the same individual in these three di¤erent games one where she keeps the winnings, one where
she knows the winnings will be donated to a charity of her choice, and the third one, where she has
discretion over whether to keep the winnings and there is an exogenous shock that determines the
desirability of making a charitable contribution by varying how much a charity will get if the player
contributes $1 ($2 or $0.2).
One of our key empirical ndings is that, for the same individual the e¤ort level is highest in
a social enterprise, relative to both for-prots and non-prots, anding which relates directly to
Proposition 1.
In the experiment, we estimate the social motivation of individuals by using a method that
measures public service motivation (so called Perry Tests). We also tested whether these measures
of pro-social motivation predict the likelihood of an individual to donate to charity when they have
a choice and nd strong evidence for this.
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Subject to all the usual limitations of experiments (e.g., external validity) these ndings demon-
strated that our framework can facilitate empirical work in the economics of social sector organi-
zations. Moreover, there are many interesting issues which seem worth exploring in future. For
example, we can analyse further the role of sorting using experimental approaches to get into the is-
sue of organizational choice (non-prot or social enterprise or for-prot) depending on who is matched
with whom.
7 Concluding Comments
This paper has explored a specic aspect of social enterprise  the possibility of having exible
missions which balance prot with purpose. We have argued that employing mission-sympathetic
citizen managers is a means of creating an incentive compatible trade-o¤. This illustrates the idea
that has been discussed informally that there is a role for sympathetic managers and workers in
social enterprises. Founders (or guardians of the mission more generally) can employ managers with
similar preferences over this trade-o¤. Our framework makes precise how this works in a specic
model and motivates how social enterprise can generate a middle ground which champions of this
innovative organizational form have articulated informally.
We have been able to anchor the comparison between social enterprise with more standard or-
ganizational forms. The key point is that there is a range of manager motivation where selection
worksand provides the ideal trade-o¤ between prot and purpose which a for-prot and non-prot
fail to achieve. The paper therefore gives a role to a recruitment strategy based on motivation
(rather than ability) in explaining how social enterprises can thrive and achieve a balance between
social goals and prot. However, there is also an implicit government failure in the background with
regulation being unable to achieve the optimal trade-o¤.
An important issue that is worthy of further investigation is the nancing sides of di¤erent forms of
enterprises in our framework. Unlike non-prots, social enterprises are able to issue equity as a means
of enhancing their access to capital markets. The fact that they are also able to make commercially-
oriented decisions also provides a prot which can be distributed to shareholders. This raises
interesting questions about whether the balance between prots and purpose will be undermined by
shareholder inuence in such cases.
There are other areas where the ideas in this paper are applicable given the importance of moti-
vated agents. Although not normally classied as social enterprises, the ideas in this paper can be
used to think about the ownership and management of sports franchises and media outlets. These
are both cases where there is a wider constituency, fans in the case of sports and citizens/politicians
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in the case of the media, who care about how the enterprise is run. In both cases, owners own such
enterprises because they too care about success in non-prot terms. In sports, club like structures
were traditionally a means of attenuating the prot motive and in media some kind of trust based
ownership is not uncommon. It would be interesting to use the ideas here to explore in more detail
how ownership and control structures a¤ect performance.
In a wider sense, the paper contributes to debates about the right organizational structures
for a market economy and how this is limited by human motivation.22 It is an abiding concern
of economists since Adam Smith that markets do not work on the basis of altruism. It perhaps
therefore goes against the grain to suggest that social enterprise is di¤erent. But wider interest
in pro-social motivation (see, for example, Benabou and Tirole, 2010) have opened up discussion
to human motivation being an asset rather than only a constraint on what can be achieved. The
key question is whether selection can work in practice and sustain an incentive compatible outcome
from a social point of view. Our matching analysis suggests that pro-social matching can indeed
be a stable outcome. This is important as it shows that social enterprise can emerge when there is
competition between organizational forms.
Greater awareness of particular externalities should also create more demand for social enterprise
as stakeholders come to value the need to balance prot with purpose even if this means forgoing some
of the benets of high powered incentives. In recent years, high inequality generated in the nancial
sector (particularly through rent-seeking and anti-social forms of risk-taking) is viewed by many as a
kind of societal pollution. Protest movements around the world have used the recent nancial crisis
to galvanize discontent about some aspects of market-driven societies. Such sentiments have been
seized upon to denounce economic reasoning, particular in spheres were social goals matter. On this
score, our analysis provides grounds for both promise and pessimism. It is promising since social
enterprise can be used to allow those with certain kinds of pro-social preferences to express and act
upon these as managers of private enterprises. But it is pessimistic when human nature rather than
organizational rules provide a limit on what can be achieved. The paper illustrates the importance of
non-selsh preferences in the functioning of social enterprises. Whether these values are hard-wired
or pliable then becomes a key determinant of what can feasibly be achieved in a market setting.
22See Besley (2013) for discussion in the context of the critique of markets by Sandel (2012).
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Observation 1: Using earlier notation, if z is the managers expected payo¤ (pecuniary
and non-pecuniary) conditional on success, then the choice of e¤ort by the manager is given by e^ (z)
and the expected payo¤ of the manager by  (z) + T = ze^ (z)  c (e^ (z)) + T: For higher values of z,
the value of e^ (z) is higher from the rst-order condition, and by the envelope theorem, the change
in  (z) is given by e^ (z). 
Proof of Observation 2: There are three ranges of M to consider. For M  , the manager
will always choose x = 0 under a social enterprise, and therefore, be indi¤erent between a social
enterprise and a for-prot. But a non-prot is strictly dominated. For M  , the manager will
always choose x = 1 in a social enterprise. Therefore he will be indi¤erent between a non-prot
and a social enterprise but a for-prot will be strictly dominated. Finally, for M 2  ; , the
manager will choose x = 1 when s = h and x = 0 when s = l in a social enterprise. In this case,
v(M) =

qMh + (1  q)

 > maxf1; Mg. Therefore, the social enterprise is preferable to the
manager to a for-prot or a non-prot. 
Proof of Proposition 1: For M  , the manager will always choose x = 0 under a social
enterprise, and so e¤ort will be the same between a for-prot and a social enterprise, namely, e^ ().
For M  , the manager will always choose x = 1 under a social enterprise, and so e¤ort will be
the same between a non-prot and a social enterprise, namely, e^
 
M

. However, for M 2  ; 
the managers e¤ort is e^
 
v
 
M

: As v(M) =

qMh + (1  q)
	
 > maxf1; Mg, it strictly
exceeds e¤ort under a for-prot or a non-prot. If the choice is between for-prots and non-prots
only, then the critical value of manager motivation will be given by e^ () = e^
 
M

, or, M = 1.
Therefore, we can dene ^  1

such that e¤ort is strictly higher under a for-prot if M < ^ and
under a non-prot if M > ^. 
Proof of Proposition 2: SFP
 
 ; M

= SNP
 
 ; M

is equivalent to the value of F =  FP that
solves  () = F e^
 
M 

+ 
 
M 

:This is equivalent to:
e^ ()  c (e^()) =  F  + M  e^  M   c  e^(M ) : (3)
It is straightforward to verify that  0FP
 
M

< 0: totally di¤erentiating (3), we get
dF
dM
=  1  F e^
0  M 
e^
 
M 
 < 0:
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For M = 0, the right-hand side of (3) is lower than the left-hand side at F  = 1, and therefore,
 FP (0) > 1=, which lies between  and : At M = , M  =

h
< 1 and therefore, at F +M  =
1, the left hand side is larger. Therefore, the two sides can be equal only if F exceeds some minimum
threshold, given by  FP () >

1  
h

1

.
Also, as  0FP
 
M

< 0, and  FP (0) >  FP () > 0,  FP (M) > 0 for all M 2 [0; ]: Therefore,
we nd that in the parameter range M  , both FP and NP can dominate depending on parameter
values. In particular, for any given level of manager motivation M , there is a level of founder
motivation  FP (M) such that for F   FP (M) NP dominates FP.  FP (M) is strictly negatively
sloped, with  FP (0) > 1 and  FP () >

1  
h

1

: Notice that 1 >

1  
h

1

.
Now we turn to the parameter range M 2  ; . For this parameter range,
v
 
M

=

qMh + (1  q)

:
Also, v
 
M

> max

M ; 1
	
for (; ). At M = , v
 
M

=  > M  and at M = ,
v
 
M

= M  > . SSE
 
 ; M

= SNP
 
 ; M

is equivalent to F =  SE solving:
F qhe^
 
v
 
M

+ 
 
v
 
M

= F e^
 
M 

+ 
 
M 

or,
 
v
 
M

+ F qh

e^
 
v
 
M
  c  e^(v  M) (4)
=
 
F  + M 

e^
 
M 
  c  e^(M ) :
Observe that F qh < 
F , i.e., the non-pecuniary payo¤ received by the founder is always lower
under a SE than a NP, since the SE chooses a commercial action when s = l: However, the e¤ort
under a SE is higher than that of a NP, as v
 
M
  M  with the strict equality holding only for
M = . This is the key trade-o¤ between a SE and a NP.
For M = , v
 
M

=  and the surplus under a FP, e^ ()   c (e^()) is strictly less than that
under a SE e^ ()  c (e^()) + F qhe^
 
v
 
M

since under the SE the social action is chosen when
s = h and the founder benets from that, even though the managers payo¤ is by construction the
same for M = . Therefore, a SE strictly dominates a FP. As v
 
M

=  > M , the critical
level of F such that a NP dominates a SE, has to be higher than the one for a FP, namely,  FP ().
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In particular, consider the threshold  
F + 

l = 1
(which is consistent with l < 1). For this value, 
F  +  =
 
F + 

qh + (1  q) and the
total payo¤ conditional on success is the same under a NP and a SE. However, the e¤ort level is
strictly higher under a SE. Therefore,  SE() is strictly higher than  FP () which in turn exceeds
1  
h

1

> 0 as shown earlier.
For M = , v
 
M

= M . Therefore, the e¤ort level is the same under a SE and a NP, and
therefore, for any F > 0, a NP must dominate. At F = 0 they yield the same surplus.
Observe that
 0SE
 
M

=  1
  
 
v
 
M
    M 
e^(M )  qhe^ (v (M))
2  @

e^
 
M 
  qhe^  v  M
@M
using the envelope theorem. As v
 
M

> M  for M 2 [; ], by Proposition 1,   v  M >

 
M 

. Also,
@

e^
 
M 
  qhe^(v  M)
@M
=
 

2
e^0
 
M 
  (qh)2 e^0  v  M :
So  0SE
 
M

< 0 for M 2 [; ] if e^0 (z) > e^0 (z) whenever z > z, that is, e^ (z) is concave. To see
when this is true, observe that
e^0 (z) =
1
c00 (e^ (z))
:
Hence it will hold whenever c000 (e) > 0. Therefore,  0SE
 
M

< 0. As  SE() > 0 =  SE() this
shows that  SE
 
M

> 0 for all M 2 [; ). 
Proof of Observation 3: We know that S^SE > S^NP for q = 0 and S^SE = S^NP for q = 1. The
condition for the sign of the derivative of S^SE   S^NP with respect to q to be negative is: 
~

!
<
(2 + ) (h   l)
(2 + ) (h   1) + 1  (1 q)(h 1)~
:
It can be veried that (2 + ) (h   l) > (2 + ) (h   1) + 1 so long as l < 1+2+ Since the right
hand side of the condition displayed above is always strictly larger than 1; while the left hand side
is close enough to 1 for  small enough, as q increases, S^SE   S^NP decreases monotonically from
strictly positive (q = 0) to zero (q = 1). The proof follows. 
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Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose M  = 1 so that the e¤ort level under a non-prot is the same
as in a for-prot. Clearly, overall surplus in a NP is lower, since the expected payo¤ from success is
lower than for-prots as F < 0. In contrast, if F = 0, then a non-prot and a for-prot will yield
the same total surplus. Extending the argument, for any value of M > 0, there exists a F < 0
such that a for-prot dominates a non-prot. Similarly, for M = , v
 
M

=  and so for F = 0,
a for-prot and a social enterprise yield the same surplus, which is higher than that of a non-prot.
But if F < 0, a FP will dominate both. Therefore, for any M 2 [; ] such that a social enterprise
dominates a non-prot and a for-prot for F  0, there exists a F < 0 such that a for-prot will
yield the highest surplus. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Our assumptions on the fraction of each type implies that all the
surplus will accrue to managers. Both SNP
 
F ; M

and SSE
 
F ; M

have a positive cross-partial
derivative with respect to M and F : Also, SFP
 
F ; M

is independent of F and M and therefore,
is weakly supermodular. However, the maximum of these supermodular functions is not necessarily
supermodular. We proceed to prove positive assortative matching using the following steps:
Step 1 : Consider a function f(F ; M) that is increasing in both arguments. Suppose it is strictly
supermodular, i.e.,
f(Fa ; 
M
a ) + f(
F
b ; 
M
b ) > f
 
Fa ; 
M
b

+ f(Fb ; 
M
a )
whenever Fa > 
F
b and 
M
a > 
M
b . Dene a function g(
F ; M) = maxff(F ; M); Cg where C is a
constant:We show that g(F ; M) is weakly supermodular and strictly so forC < maxff(Fa ; Mb ); f(Fb ; Ma )g.
As f(F ; M) is increasing in both arguments, the result is trivially true if C > f(Fa ; 
M
a ) or
C < f(Fb ; 
M
b ). Therefore, consider the case where
C 2 f  Fb ; Mb  ; f(Fa ; Ma ) :
Then
g
 
Fa ; 
M
a

+ g
 
Fb ; 
M
b

= f(Fa ; 
M
a ) + C:
As
f(Fa ; 
M
a )  maxff(Fa ; Mb ); f(Fb ; Ma ); Cg
and
f(Fa ; 
M
a ) + C  f
 
Fa ; 
M
a

+ f
 
Fb ; 
M
b

> f(Fa ; 
M
b ) + f(
F
b ; 
M
a )
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the result follows. Suppose C < maxff(Fa ; Mb ); f(Fb ; Ma )g. Then we show that g(F ; M) is strictly
supermodular. There are three cases to consider: (i) f(Fa ; 
M
b ) > C > f(
F
b ; 
M
a ). Then g
 
Fa ; 
M
b

+
g
 
Fb ; 
M
a

= f
 
Fa ; 
M
b

+ C < f
 
Fa ; 
M
a

+ C = g
 
Fa ; 
M
a

+ g
 
Fb ; 
M
b

; (ii) f(Fb ; 
M
a ) > C >
f(Fa ; 
M
b ) for which the proof is similar to (i); (iii)min

f(Fb ; 
M
a ); f(
F
a ; 
M
b )
	
> C then g
 
Fa ; 
M
b

+
g
 
Fb ; 
M
a

= f
 
Fa ; 
M
b

+ f
 
Fb ; 
M
a

< f
 
Fa ; 
M
a

+ f
 
Fb ; 
M
b

< g
 
Fa ; 
M
a

+ C = g
 
Fa ; 
M
a

+
g
 
Fb ; 
M
b

. A direct corollary of Step 1 is, that maxfSSE; SFPg and maxfSNP ; SFPg are weakly
supermodular, and strictly so for particular cases (which arise later in the proof).
Step 2 : Consider the pair (Fa ; 
M
a ) and (
F
b ; 
M
b ). Suppose 
F
a > 
F
b and 
M
a > 
M
b . Then
SNP (Fa ; 
M
a )   SNP (Fa ; Mb ) > SSE(Fa ; Ma )   SSE(Fa ; Mb ) where Ma ; Mb 2 (; ). From the
proof of Proposition 2,
@2(SNP SSE)
@F @M
> 0. Therefore,
@
 
SNP   SSE
@M
>
@
 
SNP   SSE
@M

F=0
= e^(M )  qhe^
 
v
 
M

= (1  q) le^(M )  qh

e^
 
v
 
M
  e^(M ) :
We want to show this is positive. From Observation 1, e^ (z) is increasing and from the proof of
Proposition 2 it is concave. Therefore
e^
 
v
 
M
  e^(M ) < v  M  M  e^0(M )
= (1  q)     lM e^0(M ):
For our proof, it is su¢ cient to show that qh
 
   lM

e^0(M ) < le^(
M ) for all M 2
(; ). The left-hand side is decreasing in M while the right-hand side is increasing and so it is
su¢ cient to show that qh
 
   l

e^0() < le^() which follows from assumption in the
statement of the proposition (namely, "^
 


<
l
q(h l)) given that that  =
1
h
. A similar proof
holds to establish the inequality SNP (Fa ; 
M
a )   SNP (Fb ; Ma ) > SSE(Fa ; Ma )   SSE(Fb ; Ma ). So
far in the proof of Step 2 we considered only M 2 (; ). We can extend this argument to the
case where Mb <  while 
M
a 2 (; ) and this would be needed in the proof of case 1 below.
This is done by noting that SSE(Fa ; 
M
b ) = S
SE(Fa ; ) while S
NP (Fa ; 
M
b ) < S
NP (Fa ; ). There-
fore, SNP (Fa ; 
M
a )   SNP (Fa ; Mb ) > SNP (Fa ; Ma )   SNP (Fa ; ) > SSE(Fa ; Ma )   SSE(Fa ; ) =
SSE(Fa ; 
M
a )  SSE(Fa ; Mb ).
We now proceed to prove that the unique matching equilibrium involves positive assortative
matching, i.e., a type f founder ( = 0; 1; 2) matches with a type m ( = 0; 1; 2) manager where
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 =  and some type f0 founders remain unmatched. Suppose not, and if possible let there be at
least one non-assortative match. Since type m0 managers are scarce relative to type f0 founders, we
cannot have a non-assortative match such that a type m0 manager is unmatched. There can be three
possible types of non-assortative matches:
Case 1: A type m0 manager can be matched to a type f2 (or f1) founder, and a type m2 (or m1)
manager to a type f0 principal. If there is a non-assortative match (f0;m2) would be a FP and
(f2;m0) would be a NP or FP. As maxfSNP ; SFPg is strictly supermodular, the non-assortative
match is not stable. If they are re-matched assortatively, i.e, (f0;m0) and (f2;m2), these would be
a FP and a NP respectively. Next consider a possible non-assortative match (f0;m1) and (f1;m0).
We know (f0;m1) would be a SE, but (f1;m0) could be a FP or a NP and (f1;m1) could be a NP
or a SE. These generates four possible cases, of which (f1;m0) being a FP and (f1;m1) being a SE
is easy to deal with by the supermodularity of maxfSSE; SFPg (by Step 1). Let us consider the case
where (f1;m0) and (f1;m1) are both NPs. Then we want to show:
SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SFP (F0 ; M0 ):
Notice that SFP (F0 ; 
M
0 ) = S
SE(F0 ; 
M
0 ): The result follows as
SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F1 ; M1 )  SSE(F1 ; M0 )
by Step 2 above, and
SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 )  SSE(F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SSE(F0 ; M0 )
by the supermodularity of SSE. Next consider the case where (f1;m0) is a NP and (f1;m1) is a SE.
Then we want to show
SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SFP (F0 ; M0 ):
This is true as
SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SSE(F0 ; M0 )
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by the argument above, and
SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SNP (F1 ; M1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 )
in this instance. The nal sub-case is where (f1;m0) is a FP and (f1;m1) is a NP. Then we want to
show
SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 )  SFP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SFP (F0 ; M0 ):
This follows from SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 ) > S
SE(F1 ; 
M
1 ) and given that S
SE(F0 ; 
M
1 ) > S
NP (F0 ; 
M
1 ), the
supermodularity of maxfSSE; SFPg.
Case 2: A type m1 manager can be matched to a type f2 founder, and a type m2 manager to a
type f1 founder. We know that (f2;m2) and (f1;m2) would be a NP, but (f2;m1) could be a NP or
a SE and (f1;m1) could be a NP or a SE. Obviously, if (f1;m1) is a NP then (f2;m1) would be a NP
as well. Obviously, if all four organizational forms are NP, then assortative matching follows from
the supermodularity of SNP . Therefore, let us consider the two interesting cases, where we want to
show, respectively:
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SNP (F1 ; M2 ) > SSE(F2 ; M1 )  SSE(F1 ; M1 )
and
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SNP (F2 ; M1 ) > SNP (F1 ; M2 )  SSE(F1 ; M1 ):
The rst one follows from the fact that SNP is supermodular, i.e.,
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SNP (F1 ; M2 ) > SNP (F2 ; M1 )  SNP (F1 ; M1 )
and Step 2:
SNP (F2 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M1 ) > SSE(F2 ; M1 )  SSE(F1 ; M1 ):
The second inequality follows from the fact that SNP is supermodular, i.e.,
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SNP (F2 ; M1 ) > SNP (F1 ; M2 )  SNP (F1 ; M1 )
and SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 ) < S
SE(F1 ; 
M
1 ):
Case 3: A type m0 manager is matched with a founder of type f1 (or f2), a type m1 (or m2)
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manager is matched to a type f2 (or f1) founder, and a type m2 (or m1) manager is matched to a
type f0 founder. We can repeat the types of arguments used above to show that a non-assortative
match of the above kind is not stable. 
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